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The role of the audit committee in constraining earnings management: evidence from 
Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong 
Abstract 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: The premise of this study is that there are benefits associated with 
Chinese firms listing in Hong Kong. The study seeks to determine if one of the benefits is 
better monitoring of earnings by the audit committee, which is operationalised as lower 
abnormal accruals. 
Research findings/Insights: Using data from 2004 to 2008, we find that an audit committee 
is an important monitoring mechanism as audit committee independence, expertise and size 
are associated with reduced levels of abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings 
management. This study also attempts to discern when the monitoring role of the audit 
committee is more salient for the firm. We find that ownership concentration and the 
presence of government officials on the audit committee are important determinants of the 
negative association between audit committee characteristics and earnings management.  In 
contrast, we find no significant associations between the audit committee and abnormal 
accruals for Chinese firms listed only on the Chinese domestic Stock Exchanges. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The paper contributes to the corporate governance 
literature in a transitional economy. Identifying the role of audit committees of firms listed on 
markets other than the domicile market demonstrates the importance of considering the 
institutional setting in governance research.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Investors can have greater confidence in the quality of 
financial reporting as Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong have greater transparency than firms 
only listed in the domestic market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
          Hong Kong, maintaining a highly independent political system from the mainland 
China, serves as the financial centre and investment incubator of China and becomes the first 
choice for the top Chinese firms to list in a jurisdiction other than the domestic market. In a 
World Bank Paper (WPS4978), Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi rank Hong Kong as the top 
10 countries/regime using aggregate and individual governance indicators. One of the 
methods of participating in the rapid growth of Chinese economy is to invest in the Chinese 
firms listed in Hong Kong. In order to protect their investment interest in Chinese firms, 
foreign institutional investors demand a transparent and efficient corporate governance 
system. However, in the past, China has been criticised for a lack of corporate governance 
controls (Shi and Drake, 2002; Tian, 2002; Clarke, 2003; Dahya, Karbhari, Xiao and Yang, 
2003). In response, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has published a 
number of regulations and recommendations on corporate governance for Chinese listed 
firms1. Subsequent to the regulations and recommendations issued by CSRC, there is some 
evidence showing that Chinese firms are actively moving towards improving corporate 
governance practices, such as establishing independent boards and audit committees (Li, Sun 
and Liu, 2006, Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom and Lu, 2008).   
         The purpose of this paper is to determine if the regulations and recommendations have 
been effective in improving the quality of reported earnings. In particular, we are concerned 
with the impact of audit committees on managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings. The 
CSRC, following the issue of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 
China (2001), recommends firms set up an audit committee to discharge their 
responsibilities2.  There is currently much debate about the role of the audit committee, as a 
vital internal corporate governance mechanism, in constraining earnings management.   
Research suggests that the incentives to manipulate earnings in Chinese listed firms are 
different to those in western firms (Chen and Yuan, 2004; Ding, Zhang and Zhang, 2007; Lau, 
2004; Liu and Lu, 2007; Yu, Du and Sun, 2006). Yu et al. (2006) and Ding et al. (2007) state 
that Chinese firms are keen to meet regulatory requirements to raise capital due to privatising 
State Owned Enterprises (SOE). Liu and Lu (2007, p.883) suggests two motives for earnings 
management: (1) a listed company manages earnings to avoid being de-listed; and (2) a listed 
company manages earnings to exceed certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds to earn the 
right to issue additional shares to existing shareholders.  Thus, there are strong incentives to 
manage earnings while market-based governance controls and minority shareholder 
protection is weak in China. Governance mechanisms used by Western firms, such as 
monitoring from blockholders3, takeovers4, and management stock ownership5, are rare or 
ineffective in Chinese firms.  The first objective of this paper is to determine whether an audit 
committee can curb earnings management in Chinese listed firms. We then extend the 
analysis by determining whether earnings management is likely to be systematically related 
to observable firm characteristics and monitoring.  The second objective is to discover factors 
that affect the association between audit committee characteristics and earnings management.    
Research on the association between corporate governance controls and earnings 
management in Chinese listed firms includes the role of the board (Firth, Fung and Rui, 2007; 
Lai, 2005; Lai and Tam, 2007; Liu and Lu, 2007; Zhang and Li, 2007) and ownership 
concentration (Liu and Lu, 2007; Ding et al 2007; Firth et al., 2007). However, there is little 
empirical research on whether audit committees restrain earnings management of Chinese 
firms. We operationalise our study using a sample of Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong. The 
reasons why these companies are selected for this study are: 1) The Chinese government 
supports the H-share 6   firms’ corporate governance reforms and anticipates improved 
performance. 2) These firms are in a better position to follow recommended corporate 
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governance practices due to the importance and financial strength of these H-share firms. 
Although listing in Hong Kong offers greater transparency than firms listed only in mainland 
China, further investigations of the effectiveness of corporate governance practices are 
needed to enhance stakeholders’ decision- making.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways.  In an emerging market, the 
implementation of governance recommendations on the quality of earnings information is 
likely to have a measurable impact on the market as a consequence of the change in the 
regulatory environment.  The transformation of firms from State owned enterprises to listed 
companies also provides a unique setting for investigating the impact on earnings 
management.  The results of our study provide support for the role of audit committees in 
curbing earnings management.  The results of our study also reveal the role of ownership 
concentration and the presence of government officials on the audit committee in 
constraining (exacerbating) earnings management. 
In an investigation of the impact of audit committees on earnings quality, we find that 
audit committee independence and size are negatively associated with abnormal accruals, our 
measure of earnings management.  Independent directors’ financial and industry experience 
is negatively associated with abnormal accruals but the result is marginally significant. Audit 
committee meeting frequency is not associated with earnings management. Taken together 
our results suggest that large, independent audit committees with financial and industry 
experience are more effective in reducing earnings management.  We also find that the 
monitoring role of the audit committee is more important when government officials are on 
the audit committee and when institutional ownership is low. State ownership concentration 
does not influence the association between audit committee characteristics and abnormal 
accruals. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional 
background and literature review. The hypotheses are developed in section 3 and section 4 
provides the method. The results are presented in section 5 and concluding comments in 
section 6. 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
From an institutional theory perspective, a good corporate governance system needs 
to incorporate social norms and political influences in the host country. China is currently 
labelled as a transitional economy (Hua, Miesing and Li, 2006; Li et al., 2006). A transitional 
economy is an economy which is changing from a centrally planned economy to a market 
orientated economy. The transition process is usually characterised by: changing and creating 
institutions, particularly private enterprises; changes in the role of the State, thereby, the 
creation of fundamentally different government institutions; and, the promotion of privately 
owned enterprises, markets and independent financial institutions (Bennett, Estrin and Urga, 
2007).  During the transition, the focus in China has been the rationalisation of the ownership 
structure and the development of a practical corporate governance system which is suitable 
for the Chinese institutional setting. The political and economic systems, as well as the 
characteristics of the listed firms in China are important in constructing corporate governance 
and constraining earnings management in China. 
During the economic reform of the early 1990’s, the Chinese government initiated a 
series of programmes to improve the performance of domestic incorporated companies. One 
of the approaches recommended is to list domestic firms in developed overseas markets 
(Zhou, D.J., former chairman of the CSRC, 1995). The government expects that overseas 
listed companies can be the role models for other non-overseas listed firms. The government 
expects that these overseas-listed firms can become world-class enterprises and compete with 
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the large multinational corporations through adopting advanced Anglo-Saxon management 
skills (Jia and Sun, 2005).  
The leading firms 7  have successfully listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchanges 
(HKEX) since 1993. By listing shares overseas, the Chinese firms can raise capital for 
expansion and improve corporate governance by adopting the developed markets’ Code of 
Conduct. The majority of large H-share Chinese firms are also listed on the Stock Exchanges 
of Mainland China. Listing Chinese firms in Hong Kong can be interpreted as a part of the 
Chinese government’s initiatives to privatise State Owned Enterprises (SOE).   
Compared with the Chinese Stock Exchanges, the HKEX is a relatively developed and 
mature market. Recently, Kaufmann et al., (2009) show that Hong Kong ranks higher than 
China in terms of accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Listing on 
the HKEX requires Chinese firms to follow the rules and regulations of that market and thus 
improve their corporate government practices in line with the listing requirements. Investors 
are more likely to place a higher valuation on firms listed in overseas markets; especially 
where the overseas market is more developed and mature than the local market (Bailey, 
Karolyi and Salva, 2006; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004; Lang, Lins and Millers, 2003). 
Research shows that firms incorporated in developing countries and listed in 
developed overseas markets outperform locally listed firms (Sun and Tong, 2003). One of the 
Chinese companies also listed in Hong Kong, the Bank of China, has undertaken a 
fundamental corporate restructuring in corporate governance practices (Sun and Tobin, 2005). 
Comparing the governance structures of the Bank of China before and after its IPO in Hong 
Kong in 2006, Sun and Tobin (2005) find evidence that the Bank of China increased board 
independence, including non-Chinese independent directors with Western experience, and 
provide greater transparency in some sensitive areas, such as loan classification and risk 
management 8 . Therefore, the premise of this study is that the benefits associated with 
Chinese firms listing in Hong Kong leads to more effective governance controls and the 
subsequent reduction of opportunistic earnings management.   
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Audit Committee Effectiveness 
According to agency theory, the board has an oversight role of monitoring managers.  
The board delegates some oversight duties to committees including the audit committee.  The 
role of the audit committee, as a governance mechanism, is to reduce information asymmetry 
between stakeholders and managers, thereby mitigating agency problems.  Audit committee 
oversight includes financial reporting, internal controls to assess risk, and auditor activity 
(DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed, 2002).  To fulfill the oversight role, the audit 
committee must be an effective monitor, thus giving rise to the recent governance 
recommendations and regulations.  From an agency-perspective, an effective audit committee 
fulfils its oversight role when it is independent of management, has a level of financial and 
industrial experience to carry out its duties, and actively monitors internal controls and 
financial reporting (Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein and Neal, 2006).   
The monitoring role of the audit committee is important in China due to weak legal 
protection where minority shareholders can be subject to the expropriation by the dominant 
shareholders, such as the State.  Research finds that country characteristics explain much 
more of the variance in governance than the firm level features (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2007). Consequently, the political and economic systems are 
important in considering corporate governance practices and their effect on the propensity of 
Chinese listed firms to manage earnings.  
 8 
Research on the role of the audit committee in Chinese firms finds that Chinese listed 
firms voluntarily disclose information about the audit committee (Qu and Leung, 2006) but 
the audit committee has no significant effect on firm performance (Wei, 2007).  Lin, Xiao 
and Tang (2008) find that various stakeholders (investor/creditor, independent director, 
company officer and auditor) perceive the audit committee as a ceremonial decoration acting 
to lift the image of good corporate governance.  
Prior research on the association between the audit committee and earnings 
management in China is limited to publications in the Chinese language and has produced 
mixed results (Liu and Ma, 2008; Zheng and Liu, 2008). Research in other Asian countries 
finds that audit committees play a significant role in constraining earnings management in 
firms in Hong Kong (Jaggi and Leung, 2007), Korea (Choi, Jeon, and Park, 2004), Singapore 
(Van der Zahn and Tower, 2004) and Malaysia (Bradbury, Mak and Tan, 2006).  
The scant and mixed results on the effectiveness of the audit committee in constraining 
earnings management in Chinese firms provides additional motivation for further research on 
the impact of audit committees. The following section develops hypotheses based on four 
important attributes of an audit committee (independence, competence, activity and size) and 
the association with earnings management for Chinese listed firms.  
 
Audit Committee Independence  
Independence of audit committee members has been the focus of most of the audit 
committee research but has provided conflicting results, particularly in Asian countries. For 
example, Bradbury, et al., (2006) find that board size and audit committee independence are 
related to lower abnormal working capital accruals for firms in Singapore and Malaysia.  In 
contrast, Rahman and Ali (2006) find no significant relationship between audit committee 
independence and earnings management in Malaysian firms. Hence, different institutional 
settings provide the impetus and justification for further investigation.  
Research published in China has also provided mixed results.  Zha (2006) finds that the 
presence and size of the audit committee has a positive impact on increasing earnings quality 
while audit committee independence has no significant impact9.  In contrast, Zheng and Liu 
(2008) show that the presence of an audit committee and audit committee independence are 
negatively associated with the magnitude of earnings management. Liu and Ma (2008) find 
that the association between the existence of an audit committee and earnings management is 
not evident in 2004 but is significant in 200510. The difference between empirical results in 
2004 and 2005 may be due to the changes in the institutional environment11.    
We suggest that the effectiveness of the audit committee will improve over time. 
Further, the State Council published a Provision for Internal Auditing Management in 
Federal SOEs (October 2004, Chinese Version), requiring SOE to set up an independent 
audit committee under the board of directors in compliance with Code of Conduct for listed 
firms and internal control mechanisms. Therefore, as the State is influential in determining 
compliance with the corporate governance code in China (Chambers, 2005) and has increased 
the emphasis on the role of the audit committee, an independent audit committee is likely to 
constrain earnings management.  As alternative governance controls and minority 
shareholder protection is weak in China, an increase in representation by independent 
directors on the audit committee is more likely to contribute to effective overall monitoring of 
Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong.  The current study attempts to shed light on whether 
independent directors are effective in reducing earnings management. The preceding 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative association between audit committee 
independence and earnings management for Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong.    
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Audit Committee Experience 
         Boards and committees include outside/independent directors as they bring resources to 
the firm that reduce the dependency between the organisation and externalities, which, in turn, 
reduces uncertainties, lowers transaction costs and assists in the survival of the firm (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003).  Agency theory posits that outside members facilitate effective 
monitoring, because they are independent of management and have reputational incentives to 
signal to the labour market that they are experts in decision control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Subsequently, it is the resources independent directors bring to the audit committee that is the 
key to whether the committee is effective in detecting earnings management. 
          In a transitional economy, such as China, it is important that audit committee members 
have accounting, financial and industrial competence that supports the monitoring role of the 
board.  Research in the U.S. finds that audit committee members’ financial sophistication is 
an important factor in constraining earnings management (Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau, 
2004; Carcello et al., 2006; Chtourou, Bedard and Courteau, 2001; Dhaliwal, Naiker and 
Navissi, 2006; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2003). This implies that audit committee’s 
financial expertise supplements other corporate governance mechanisms in constraining 
earnings management. 
An audit committee, without financially sophisticated members may be largely 
ceremonial as suggested by Lin et al. (2008).  In this paper, it is anticipated that including 
independent directors on the audit committee with financial and industry experience is 
associated with the committees’ ability to detect earnings management and complements the 
monitoring role of the independent audit committee.   There is no prior research examining 
the financial and industry expertise of the audit committee of Chinese listed firms.  This leads 
to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative association between independent audit 
committee directors’ experience and earnings management for Chinese firms 
listed in Hong Kong.   
 
Audit Committee Activity 
          Audit committee members must actively take part in meetings and assume the 
responsibilities of an audit committee member to effectively monitor the use of accruals. The 
number of audit committee meetings is the only publicly available quantitative signal about 
the diligence of audit committees, and regulators have emphasised the need for frequent 
meetings of the audit committee (Raghunandan and Rama, 2007). Prior U.S. research finds 
that more active audit committees are more effective monitors of earnings management 
(Chtourou et al. 2001; Xie et al., 2003) and earnings restatements (Abbott, Parker, and Peters, 
2004).  Conversely, Lin, Li and Yang (2006), Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Bédard et al. 
(2004) find no significant association. We suggest that audit committee activity is likely to 
affect audit committee effectiveness and subsequently limit earnings management.  The 
preceding discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative association between audit committee activity 
and earnings management for Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong.   
 
Audit Committee Size  
         Research has considered the size of the board as an important governance characteristic, 
although results are inconclusive on whether it is better to have smaller or larger boards (see 
for example, Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999; Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 
1998; and Yermack, 1996).  The scant research on the importance of the size of the audit 
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committee has also produced mixed results.  Xie et al. (2003) and Abbott et al. (2004) find 
that the size of the audit committee is not significantly related to earnings management. Yang 
and Krishnan (2005) and Lin et al. (2006) find that audit committee size is negatively 
associated with earnings management.  In China, Zha (2006) finds that the size of the audit 
committee has a positive impact on increasing earnings quality.   
A smaller audit committee may be more effective at as it may be less encumbered with 
bureaucratic problems. Hence, smaller audit committees may provide better financial 
reporting oversight. Alternately, a larger audit committee may be able to draw from a broader 
range of experience. If so, a larger audit committee might be better at preventing earnings 
management.  Consequently, no direction is predicted for the following hypothesis: 
           Hypothesis 4: The size of the audit committee is associated with earnings 
management for Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong. 
 
Organisational Characteristics.  
         Earning management requires opportunity and motive and there are many organisational 
characteristics that are likely to affect managers’ opportunity and incentive to manipulate 
earnings. The sensitivity of audit committee monitoring to earnings management is likely to 
be lower in firms that have less information asymmetry and have good internal and external 
governance. Some of the many factors that are likely to moderate or strengthen the audit 
committee/earnings management association are discussed in the next section. These factors 
are considered to be of particular interest to Chinese firms and are not exhaustive. There is no 
assertion that this is a completely specified model. The following factors suggest firm 
characteristics that strengthen the monitoring role of the audit committee in detecting 
earnings management.  
  
The Role of Government Officials 
          According to Chambers (2005), the responsibilities of audit committees in China are 
broadly similar to the U.K. although in China the market and the regulator are more closely 
aligned with the State.  Subsequently the State is more influential in determining compliance 
with the corporate governance code. Research also shows that senior management in Chinese 
listed firms maintain close political relations with the monitoring agent (the State) (Xu, Zhu 
and Lin, 2005). Fan, Wong and Zhang, (2007) find that approximately 25 percent of CEOs 
are previously, or currently, government officials. They also find that some middle-level 
management officers are directly transferred from being government officials with no 
professional corporate background. Thus, the individuals charged with management are 
delegated from the State and are therefore not independent from the State. As government 
officials are not independent of the State, they have incentives to serve the controlling 
shareholder interests (the State) rather than the interests of the minority shareholders. Their 
lack of independence suggests that these firms experience greater information asymmetry, 
and the role of the audit committee in detecting earnings management becomes even more 
important.  Therefore, we expect that the audit committee will have greater impact on 
earnings management in firms with government officials on the audit committee than firms 
without government officials on the audit committee.   
           Hypothesis 5: The negative association between audit committee 
characteristics and earnings management is only significant when there are 
government officials on the audit committee.    
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         Ownership concentration  
         A central governance issue is the degree of ownership concentration, a distinctive 
characteristic of Chinese listed firms with approximately two-thirds of issued shares held 
directly or indirectly by the State. Concentrated ownership affects the level of information 
asymmetry between managers and investors and provides incentives to manage earnings (Fan 
and Wong, 2002; Firth et al., 2007; Donnelly and Lynch, 2002).  Fan and Wong (2002) find 
that concentrated ownership in East-Asian firms creates agency conflicts between controlling 
owners and outside investors so that controlling owners manage earnings for self-interested 
purposes and to prevent leakage of proprietary information about the firms' rent-seeking 
activities. More recently, Liu and Lu’s (2007) results suggest that agency conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority investors account for a significant portion of earnings 
management in China's listed firms.   
The privatisation of SOE offers institutional investors a means for pursuing investment 
opportunities in an emerging market. However, as the State still has a controlling stake in 
most of the publicly listed firms, the shareholdings of the institutional investors are relatively 
small. Therefore, the research question is whether different types of ownership concentration 
are associated with earnings management.  
State ownership:  Research, examining the association between State-ownership and 
corporate performance, has produced conflicting results. Qi, Wu and Zhang, (2000) and 
Wang, Xu and Zhu (2004) report a significant and negative association between State-
ownership concentration and firm performance. While, Wei (2007) finds that there is only a 
significant and negative impact on company performance when State-ownership is above 50 
percent.  Tian and Estrin (2008) finds a U-shaped relationship; corporate value decreases with 
increases in State ownership when the State is a small shareholder; and increases when the 
State equity holding is large. In contrast, Sun and Tong (2003), and Ma and Wei (2004) 
report an inverted U-shaped relationship between State-ownership concentration and 
corporate performance.   
Research examining the association between State-owned shareholding and earnings 
management is scant and mixed.  Firth et al., (2007) find that State-ownership concentration 
is positively associated with discretionary accruals at the 10 percent level while Ding et al 
(2007) find that at lower levels of State-ownership there is a positive association with 
earnings management and a negative association at high levels of ownership.   
As the dominant shareholder, the government influences the rights of other 
shareholders in corporate governance.  The government dominates the board through their 
controlling ownership and can appoint directors, managers and supervisory directors.   
Further, the government may emphasise political objectives and/or social welfare objectives 
rather than wealth maximisation while individual politicians have their own goals, such as 
maximising their political base. In addition, state-controlled firms may manipulate earnings 
to hide the expropriation of funds12 for financing IPO requirements and to achieve a higher 
IPO price for their subsidiaries (Ding et al., 2007).  Therefore, when State-ownership 
concentration is high, the conflict of interest between the State and minority shareholders is 
greater and the incentives to increase earnings management are stronger.   
Conversely, with the increased privatisation of Chinese listed firms and as the 
percentage of non-state owned shares increases, the incentive to expropriate funds declines.  
As a result, when State-ownership concentration is low, there is less conflict of interest 
between the State and minority shareholders, and lower incentives to manipulate earnings.  
Changes in the controlling interests of the State suggests that the association between audit 
committee characteristics and earnings management is weaker for firms with low State 
ownership than for firms with high State ownership. 
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Institutional investors: Theoretically, institutional investors with substantial 
shareholdings have more wealth and resources to gather more informative and relevant 
information than individual investors (Jiambalvo et al. 2002). In doing so, the sophisticated 
institutional investors are able to monitor the firms’ operation and deter managers from acting 
opportunistically. However, others argue that short-term institutional shareholdings may 
encourage managers to manipulate the accounting figures to meet or beat earnings targets to 
obtain short-term profit (Bushee, 1998).   
Yuan, Xiao, Milonas and Zou (2008) suggest that financial institutions play a limited 
role in monitoring the governance of listed firms in China, mainly due to the concentrated 
state ownership, an immature regulatory environment, inadequate transparency and 
disclosure of financial information, and weak corporate governance within financial 
institutions.  However, Yuan et al.’s (2008) study was conducted in 2003 when there were 
fewer mutual funds and securities companies.  It is therefore important to empirically test the 
role institutional investors play in the quality of earnings and consequently the effectiveness 
of the recent regulatory reforms. 
A company may commit to providing higher quality earnings to encourage foreign 
investors to invest. In addition, foreign investors will put pressure on companies to improve 
the quality of their accounting information to protect their investment. Collectively, 
institutional investors may be able to exert pressure on a company to improve the quality of 
the financial statements. Firth et al., (2007) find that the presence of foreign shareholders is 
negatively associated with discretionary accruals.  We expect that the higher the collective 
share ownership of institutional investors the lower will be earnings management and thus the 
monitoring role of the audit committee declines.   
A study on corporate governance would be incomplete without considering the impact 
of ownership on the incentives to disclose earnings information, particularly in a country such 
as China with evolving and unique ownership characteristics. The monitoring role of 
institutional investors suggests that the association between audit committee characteristics 
and earnings management is only important for firms with low institutional ownership. The 
previous discussion suggests that the monitoring role of audit committee is dependent on 
ownership concentration and leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: The negative association between audit committee characteristics 
and abnormal accruals is dependent on ownership concentration.   
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample and data 
This research uses a non-random sample of the top 208 firms listed on the HKEX in 2004 to 
200813. The sample of listed H-share firms are blue-chip companies in China. To clarify, they 
are the counterparts of Citic Bank, Exxon Mobil and IBM in the U.S. and are the 
representatives of corporate China. The audit committee data is hand collected from the 
firm’s annual financial reports while the financial data is collected from the WIND database 
for the firms listed in mainland China and the Mintglobal database for the firms listed on the 
HKEX. The sample size for testing the hypotheses is 184, as 10 firms did not disclose 
information on audit committee meetings and 14 firms failed to disclose information on audit 
committee experience.   
 
Method 
 There are three main research designs for testing earnings management: (1) those 
based on aggregate accruals, (2) those based on specific accruals and (3) those based on the 
distribution of earnings (McNichols, 2000). According to McNichols’s statistics from top 
eight accounting journals, the first method is used most. The commonly used Jones model 
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and modified Jones model are based on aggregate accruals. The specific accrual approach can 
utilise researchers’ accounting knowledge to test particular area of accruals in different 
institutional settings.  
Total accruals can be split into expected and abnormal (non-discretionary and 
discretionary accruals) accruals. Abnormal accruals can be manipulated by management by 
using professional judgment in their accounting choices. Therefore, abnormal accruals 
models are often used in detecting earnings management so that abnormal accruals and 
earnings management are associated in the literature (Kothari, 2001).  
Abnormal accruals are used for a measurement of earnings management by many 
previous researchers (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995, Guay, Kothari and Watts, 1996, 
Kasznik 1999, Bartov, Gul and Tsui, 2000, and Kothari, 2001). There are several models 
applied to calculate abnormal accruals. However, the modified Jones models have been used 
extensively in previous research for measurement of earnings management.  Following Jones 
(1991), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Butler, Leone and Willenborg (2004), we use the 
modified Jones model from Butler et al. (2004) as a proxy for earnings management.  We 
also use variations of this model in testing the robustness of our results.   
 
TA it/ATit = α0 + α1 (∆Rev it/ATit) + α2 (PPE it/ATit) + ε                               (1) 
 
Where: TAit is total accruals calculated by adding earnings before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations minus operating cash flows from continuing operations and then 
divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.  ATit is the total assets for firm i in the 
year t. ∆Revit is the change in revenue firm i in the year t.  PPEit is the net property, plant and 
equipment firm i in the year t. Total accruals are separated into expected accruals and 
abnormal accruals.   
 The following models are developed to test the hypotheses.  Separate regressions are 
run for Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and firms only listed in mainland China to test 
whether the existence of an audit committee is associated with abnormal accruals. The second 
model tests whether audit committee characteristics are associated with abnormal accruals.  
ABAC = α0 + α1AC + α2BIG4 + α3LEV + α4ROA + α5MBVA + α6LNAT + α7YEAR + e     
             (2) 
ABAC =  α0 + α1ACIND + α2ACEXP + α3ACM + α4ACSIZE + α5BIG4 + α6LEV + 
α7ROA + α8MBVA + α9LNAT + α10YEAR + e                                            (3)             
Where: 
Dependent Variable:  
ABAC: Abnormal accruals are the residuals from running the regression of equation (1). 
Independent Variables: 
AC: Dummy variable 1 if the firm has an audit committee, 0 otherwise. 
ACIND: Number of independent directors divided by total number of directors on the audit 
committee. 
ACEXP: Factor score of independent audit committee members' accounting, financial and 
industry experience is created by using principle components factor analysis. The three 
components are: the number of independent audit committee directors with accounting 
experience divided by the number of directors on the audit committee; number of 
independent audit committee directors with financial experience divided by the number of 
directors on the audit committee; number of independent audit committee directors with 
industrial experience divided by the number of directors on the audit committee. 
ACM: Number of audit committee meetings held annually. 
ACSIZE:  Number of directors on the audit committee. 
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Control variables:  
BIG4: Dummy variable 1 if the firm is audited by a Big4 accounting firm; 0 otherwise.  
LEV:  Leverage is (Long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) / total assets. 
ROA: Return on asset is calculated as earnings before interest and extraordinary income 
divided by total assets.  
MBVA: Book to market value is calculated as market capitalisation divided by the book 
value of asset.  
LNAT: Firm size is measured as total assets in million RMB. A natural logarithmic 
transformation is performed to normalise data and the transformed variable.  
INDUSTRY: Dummy variable 1 if materials or industrials; 0 otherwise. 
YEAR: Dummy variable for each year 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
 
 The Role of Government Officials and Ownership Concentration 
Three separate models include interaction terms to test whether the association between audit 
committee characteristics and abnormal accruals depend on whether government officials are 
on the audit committee or on ownership concentration. 
ABAC =  α0 + α1GOV*ACIND + α2GOV*ACEXP + α3GOV*ACM + α4GOV*ACSIZE 
+ α5GOV + α6ACIND + α7ACEXP + α8ACM + α9ACSIZE + α10BIG4 + α11LEV + α12ROA 
+ α13MBVA + α14LNAT + α15YEAR + α16INDUSTRY + e       (4) 
 
 
ABAC =  α0 + α1STATE*ACIND + α2STATE*ACEXP + α3STATE*ACM + 
α4STATE*ACSIZE + α5STATE + α6ACIND + α7ACEXP + α8ACM + α9ACSIZE + α10BIG4 
+ α11LEV + α12ROA + α13MBVA + α14LNAT + α15YEAR + e        (5) 
 
 
ABAC =  α0 + α1INSTIT*ACIND + α2INSTIT*ACEXP + α3INSTIT*ACM + 
α4INSTIT*ACSIZE + α5INSTIT + α6ACIND + α7ACEXP + α8ACM + α9ACSIZE + α10BIG4 
+ α11LEV + α12ROA + α13MBVA + α14LNAT + α15YEAR + e      (6) 
 
Where: 
GOV: Dummy variable of 1 if the audit committee includes government officials; 0: 
otherwise.  
STATE:  Dummy variable of 1 if the proportion of State shareholdings to total issued shares 
is greater than or equal to the median; 0 otherwise.  
INSTIT: Dummy variable of 1 if the proportion of non-controlling institutional sponsor 
shareholdings to total issued shares is less than the median; 0 otherwise. 
 
Control Variables 
        In addition to the experimental variables, we use prior research to identify and control 
for other factors that are likely to motivate managers to manipulate earnings. Big 4 auditors 
(Big4): Research on the association between Big 4 auditors and earnings management show 
that firms audited by the Big 4 have lower levels of earnings management, implying that Big 
4 auditors help to constrain earnings management (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and 
Subramanyam, 1998; Krishnan, 2003). We expect a negative association between Big 4 and 
abnormal accruals. Leverage (LEV): A firm’s leverage ratio influences both risk management 
and accrual management (Smith and Stulz, 1985). As managers may manage earnings to 
avoid debt covenant violations (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994), we would 
expect a positive association with abnormal accruals. We predict that the coefficient will be 
positive.  
Market-to-book ratio (MBVA): It is easier for fast growing firms to engage in earnings 
manipulation than it is for mature firms since it is difficult to observe the business activities 
of fast growing firms. Further, firms growing rapidly may have internal control problems 
(Kinney and McDaniel, 1989). Companies with high growth rates may have problems 
operating efficient audit committees and this might exacerbate the practice of earnings 
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management. Firm performance (ROA): Managers that perform poorly are likely to use 
(discretionary) accruals to manipulate earnings due to the threat of dismissal. Return on assets 
is included as a control variable as it is expected that firms with lower performance tend to 
manipulate earnings figures and this should be positively associated with earnings 
management. We predict that the coefficient of ROA will be negative.  Firms size (LNAT): 
Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that firm size is positively related to various types of 
corporate governance controls such as debt covenants, dividend policy, and management 
compensation.  We expect less manipulation of earnings in larger firms as they are more 
likely to have greater analyst following and consequently are under greater scrutiny. Different 
types of industry may have more opportunity and incentive to manipulate earnings so we 
control for industry (INDUSTRY) using dummy variables.  Finally, YEAR is included in the 
model as the economic conditions in a particular year are likely to be associated with the 
motivation to manipulate earnings. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
         The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 Panel A for the sample of 184 HKEX 
listed firms used in the regression analysis. Descriptive statistics for audit committee 
characteristics reveal that the audit committee consists of an average of 3.5 members 
(minimum 2; maximum 7) with 83 percent of the members classified as independent 
(minimum 20 percent; maximum 100 percent).  The audit committee meets on average 3.5 
times per year (minimum 1; maximum 16).  Fifty percent of the firms report 100 percent 
audit committee independence.   The characteristics of the audit committee reveal that on 
average 46 percent of independent directors on the audit committee have accounting 
experience (ACACC), 56 percent have financial experience (ACFIN) and 28 percent have 
industry experience (ACINDY).  
            Fifty percent (92 firms) of the HKEX listed firms have at least one government 
official on the audit committee. Descriptive statistics for the ownership variables indicate that 
the State-controlling ownership (STATE) percentage is on average 49 percent of issued shares 
(minimum 15 percent; maximum 86 percent).  The percentage of issued shares for non-
controlling institutional investors (INSTIT) is on average 18 percent of issued shares 
(minimum 0.01percent; maximum 61 percent).  
Details on industry and year by year collection patterns are reported in Table 1 Panel 
B.  Seventy-three percent of the sample is in the material and industrial sector. The 2007 data 
was collected for a pilot study, thus 2007 represents nearly 50 percent of the sample.  
 
 
         The Pearson’s Correlation Matrix presented in Table 2 demonstrates that the only 
significant correlations with the dependent variable, abnormal accruals, are the control 
variables, Big4 audited, leverage, ROA and year (2004 and 2008). While there are several 
statistically significant correlations between some of the explanatory variables, none of them 
are highly correlated.  
 
 
To test the premise of this study that Chinese firms listing in Hong Kong have  more 
effective governance controls we matched the sample of 208 HKEX listed Chinese firms with 
208 Chinese firms listed only on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges.  The sample 
was matched on size and industry.  The first test determines whether the existence of an audit 
committee is associated with abnormal accruals and is reported in Table 3 (Panel A and B). 
98 percent of the HKEX listed firms have an audit committee while 66.7 percent of 
mainland-listed firms have an audit committee. There is no significant association between 
Insert  Table 1 about here 
Insert  Table 2 about here 
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the existence of an audit committee and abnormal accruals for the HKEX listed Chinese firms 
or the Shanghai or Shenzhen listed firms.14  This result suggests that the mere existence of an 
audit committee is not associated with deterring earnings management for Chinese listed 
firms15. 
Table 3 (Panel C) reports the results of testing the association between the audit 
committee characteristics and abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings management (H1-
4)16. The model used in Table 3 (Panel C) explains 23.6 percent of the variability in abnormal 
accruals. The first hypothesis is supported as the results of testing H1 show a significant 
negative association between audit committee independence and earnings management (B = -
0.077; p = 0.003). The results of testing H2 show that there is a marginally significant 
negative association between the financial and industry experience of independent directors 
on the audit committee and abnormal accruals (B = -0.012; p = 0.072) and thus H2 is weakly 
supported.  We use a factor score derived from a principal components factor analysis 
incorporating the combined effects of accounting, financial and industry experience. The 
result could be improved by increasing the sample size or finding another measure of 
experience rather that the disclosures in the annual reports.  
The results of testing H3 show that there is no significant association between audit 
committee activity and earnings management. This result conflicts with prior research 
(Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides, 2000, Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi, 2006) and 
infers that meeting frequency is inadequate as a proxy for audit committee activity.  Testing 
H4 shows the effect of audit committee size and finds that this variable is negatively and 
significantly associated with earnings management (B = -0.024; p = 0.004).  The negative 
association implies that larger audit committees are more efficient in monitoring earnings 
manipulation by management.  This result agrees with the results of Yang and Krishnan 
(2005) and Lin et al. (2006) who find that audit committee size is negatively associated with 
earnings management.   The control variables that are negatively and significantly associated 
with abnormal accruals include leverage, return on assets, and Big4 audited, while size is 
positively associated with abnormal accruals.  The results for the control variables are only 
significant for the HKEX listed Chinese firms. 
 
 
To test H5 and further investigate the independence of the audit committee, we 
include an interaction term using a dummy variable for firms that have a government official 
on the audit committee.  The government official dummy is interacted separately with each 
audit committee characteristic and the results are reported in Table 4 (Panel A). The model 
explains 24.4 percent of the variability in abnormal accruals.  The results show that audit 
committee size is negatively and significantly associated with abnormal accruals only when 
there are government officials on the audit committee. There is also a positively significant 
association between the presence of a government official on the audit committee and 
abnormal accruals.  This result suggests that a large audit committee is required to detect 
earnings management when there is at least one government official on the committee. 
To determine the impact of ownership on the association between audit committee 
characteristics and abnormal accruals we include an interaction term using a dummy variable 
for State ownership of the median (≥ 50.1 percent) and audit committee characteristics and 
report the results in Table 4 (Panel B). The model explains 31.8 percent of the variation in 
abnormal accruals. The results show that the audit committee’s association with abnormal 
accruals does not depend on the level of State ownership. There is no significant association 
between the audit committee and abnormal accruals when State ownership is either high or 
low and suggests a decline in the influence of State as privatisation progresses.  
Insert  Table 3 about here 
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 Table 4 (Panel C) reports the results of the interaction of institutional ownership on 
the association between audit committee characteristics and abnormal accruals. The results 
reveal that a significant negative association between audit committee size and abnormal 
accruals depends on low levels of institutional ownership. It appears that firms with low 
institutional ownership rely on a large audit committee to detect earnings management. As 
there is no significant association between the audit committee and abnormal accruals for 
high levels of institutional ownership, the evidence is consistent with the conjecture that 
institutional investors perform an active role in monitoring and scrutinising managerial 
performance. The results suggest that high institutional ownership substitute the monitoring 
role of the audit committee in constraining earnings management. There is also weak 
evidence that audit committee experience is important for deterring earnings management 
when institutional ownership is low.  A more significant result may be found with a larger 
sample17.  
 
 
 
Throughout the analysis, we used variations on the modified Jones model as the 
dependent variable and the results remained consistent although the explanatory power of the 
models declined.  White’s general test is conducted to examine the heteroskedasticity issues 
in the regression models. The results show that the test statistics between the predictive 
variables and the squared residuals are not significant suggesting limited heteroskedasticity.  
In addition to the regressions using interaction terms, we also split the sample into firms with 
and without government officials on the audit committee and a median split of ownership 
concentration to ensure the validity of the analysis. The results show that there are no 
significant associations between audit committee characteristics and abnormal accruals for 
Insert  Table 4 about here 
the subsample without government officials on the audit committee. The ownership results 
are consistent with the interaction results.  
The hypotheses predict that firms with an audit committee complying with the 
regulation are more likely to have a low level of earnings management. However, the issue of 
endogeneity may be presented in our study and it is arguably that firms with high level of 
earnings management may choose to have a poor corporate governance system. If this is the 
case, firms aggressively managing earnings may choose not to follow the regulators’ 
recommendation/regulation and adopt a less-functional audit committee. In other words, not 
only the independent variables influence dependent variables, but also the dependent 
variables can have an impact in independent variables. In order to identify the issue of 
endogeneity, two tests are performed. The first one is the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (DWH 
test). Based on the regression results, audit committee independence (ACIND), size (ACSIZE) 
and expertise (ACEXP) are all significantly related with AABA. Using DWH test, we first 
calculate the residuals of ACIND, ACSIZE and ACEXP and then insert these residuals into the 
regression of the original model together with all the exogenous variables. The untabulated 
results from the DWH test show that the F-value and coefficients on endogenous variables 
are not significant.  
The second test is to lag the suspected endogenous variables by one period. This 
method follows Dahl and Sterner, (1991) and Baum, Caglayan and Talavera, (2008). The 
sample data we use is the unbalanced panel data. Some firms have a continuous five years 
observation and the others have only one year observation. We choose the firms in our 
sample with a continuous three years observation and lag ACIND, ACSIZE and ACEXP by 
one year. The results from the regression is insignificant, suggesting that the H-share firms’ 
audit committee characteristics is not significantly influenced by earnings management 
magnitude at that time and so endogeneity does not appear to be a problem.  
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CONCLUSION 
The results of this study have implications for investors and regulators interested in 
Chinese listed firms.  The interest in Chinese stocks is driven by the strong growth of the 
Chinese economy and the potential to develop further in the future.  The results of this study 
imply that investors wishing to invest in Chinese firms can have greater confidence in the 
quality of earnings when the firm is listed in Hong Kong as these firms comply with a 
regulatory framework with greater transparency and stricter governance controls than firms 
listed only in mainland China. 
 
The major limitation of this study is the size of the sample which restricts the 
generalisability of the results.  Despite this limitation, the preliminary results provide a 
fruitful area for further research. 
                                                 
1  Publications include: The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (2001), The 
Recommendation for the Institution of Independent Directors in Listed Companies (2001) and The Regulations 
on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies (2007). 
2 According to Paragraph 54, CSRC, (2001) the main duties of the audit committee are (1) to recommend the 
engagement or replacement of the company's external auditing institutions; (2) to review the internal audit 
system and its execution; (3) to oversee the interaction between the company's internal and external auditing 
institutions; (4) to inspect the company's financial information and its disclosure; and (5) to monitor the 
company's internal control system. 
3 There are a very small number of institutional owners in China. 
4 Hostile takeovers are rare as the State has a controlling interest in the majority of listed firms and their shares 
are not publicly traded.  
5 Top executives own a very small proportion of outstanding shares, typically around 1% (Liu and Lu (2007). 
6 H-shares are shares of listed firms that are incorporated in the People's Republic of China and approved by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission for a listing in Hong Kong. 
7 These leading firms are the largest banks, insurance companies, telecomm companies and large industrial 
companies. The majority of these firms are also listed on the Chinese mainland markets, i.e. the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
8  Bank of China 2006 IPO prospectus published on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on 18 May 2006 
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060518/LTN20060518000.htm. Before the IPO, the Bank 
of China did not disclose the information regarding to the detailed loan classification and risk management. The 
Bank of China follows the Hong Kong listing rules to set up a Western style of corporate governance structures 
but at the same time keeps some unique characteristics of Chinese firms based on different law origins and 
institutions.  
9 The research uses the sample of firms from 2002 to 2004, immediately after the issue of the Code of Conduct 
by the CSRC.   
10 Zheng and Liu (2008) use data only from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  The Shenzhen Stock Exchange is 
the listing house for entrepreneurial firms and is smaller than the Shanghai Stock Exchange. In contrast, Liu and 
Ma (2008) examine all the firms from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges, thus providing a plausible 
explanation for the difference in their findings.  
11 In 2004, 43.24 percent of firms listed on the stock exchange had an audit committee while 52.63 percent of 
firms had an audit committee in 2005.   
                                                                                                                                                        
12 Ding et al (2007) suggest that the parent company may siphon valuable assets into its listed subsidiary in 
order to boost earnings and may absorb unprofitable units from the listed company prior to listing. 
13  As of June 18 2009 there are 470 Chinese mainland firms listed on the HKEX 
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90857/6681729.html) 
14 Further analysis of the relationship between audit committee characteristics and abnormal accruals for the 
Chinese firms only in China showed no significant association between audit committee characteristics and 
abnormal accruals.  In addition, the sample size decreased (46), primarily due to lack of disclosure. 
15 Unreported results show that the Hong Kong listed firms have significantly lower abnormal accruals than the 
mainland listed firms. 
16 Tests for multicollinearity are run simultaneously with each regression. Variance inflation factors are within 
acceptable levels in all cases (< 2) and are subsequently not reported in the Tables. 
17 Testing the main effects (excluding the interaction terms) between the presence of government officials or 
ownership concentration and abnormal accruals reveals that there are no significant associations.  
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Panel B 
Sampling Method 
Industry 
 
No. firms Year 
observed 
No. firms 
 
Observation 
frequency 
No. firms 
Consumer Staples 2 2004 7 5 years 5 
Material   50 2005 18 4 years 12 
Consumer Discretionary   18 2006 27 3 years 8 
Industrial 84 2007 91 2 years 13 
Health Care   4 2008 41 1 year 146 
Utilites 13     
I.T.   5     
Financials 8     
Total 184  184  184 
TABLE 1  
Panel A 
Descriptive Statistics (N=184) 
Variables - continuous 
 Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
 ABAC 0.105 0.083 0.088 0.000 0.464 
ACIND 0.835 1.000 0.192 0.200 1.000 
ACSIZE 3.538 3.000 0.868 2.000 7.000 
ACM 3.462 3.000 1.855 1.000 16.000 
ACACC 0.460 0.367 0.217 0.000 1.000 
ACFIN 0.563 0.667 0.285 0.000 1.000 
ACINDY 0.285 0.333 0.222 0.000 1.000 
ROA 0.050 0.046 0.072 -0.333 0.235 
MBVA 2.743 1.763 3.980 -6.707 42.332 
LEV 0.173 0.151 0.151 0.000 0.621 
AT 61,125 18,461  151,808  1,004  1,194,901 
STATE# 0.488 0.501 0.130 0.149 0.864 
INSTIT 0.177 0.155 0.133 0.001 0.614 
Variables  - dichotomous Coding Firms in the sample 
Percentage of 
sample  
BIG4  1 143 77.7%  
GOV  1 91 49.5%  
MATERIALS  1 50 27.2%  
INDUSTRIALS  1 84 45.7%  
ABAC: Abnormal accruals. ACIND: Proportion of independent directors to total directors on the audit committee. ACSIZE: 
Number of directors on the audit committee. ACM: Number of audit committee meeting annually. ACACC: Proportion of 
directors with accounting experience on the audit committee.  ACFIN: Proportion of directors with financial experience on the 
audit committee.  ACINDY: Proportion of directors with industrial experience on the audit committee. ROA: Return on asset. 
MBVA: Market to Book value of assets. LEV:  (Long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) / total assets. AT: Total assets in 
million RMB.  STATE: Proportion of state’s shareholdings to total issued shares. INSTIT: Proportion of non-controlling 
institutional investor’s shareholdings to total issued shares. BIG4: Dummy variable of 1 if audited by a BIG4 firm; 0: otherwise. 
GOV: Dummy variable of 1 if the audit committee includes government officials; 0: otherwise. 
 # Among the sample of 184 firms, there are 176 firms controlled directly and indirectly by the State.  
TABLE 2 
 Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N=184) 
  ABAC ACSIZE ACM ACIND ACEXP BIG4 ROA MBVA LEV LNAT YEAR04 YEAR05 YEAR06 YEAR07 YEAR08 GOV STATE# 
ABAC 1                                 
ACSIZE -0.088 1                               
ACM 0.031 0.123 1                             
ACIND -0.031 -0.291** -0.079 1                           
ACEXP -0.040 -0.237** 0.068 -0.127 1                         
BIG4 -0.160* 0.076 0.084 0.086 -0.098 1                       
ROA -0.159* -0.042 -0.142 -0.017 -0.042 0.014 1                     
MBVA -0.095 0.119 -0.084 -0.038 -0.166* 0.113 0.141 1                   
LEV -0.215** 0.069 0.260** -0.107 0.040 0.116 -0.304** -0.088 1                 
LNAT 0.043 0.155* 0.288** 0.027 -0.106 0.397** 0.085 0.125 .300** 1               
YEAR04 -0.145* 0.008 0.027 -0.086 -0.079 -0.030 -0.034 -0.066 0.049 -0.066 1             
YEAR05 -0.073 -0.036 0.066 -0.004 0.049 0.000 0.018 -0.112 0.130 -0.062 -0.065 1           
YEAR06 -0.061 0.008 -0.021 0.017 0.029 0.074 -0.047 -0.075 0.182* 0.031 -0.082 -0.137 1         
YEAR07 -0.111 -0.050 -0.241** 0.077 -0.105 0.007 0.183* 0.289** -0.327** -0.145* -0.197** -0.326** -0.410** 1       
YEAR08 0.304** 0.075 0.248** -0.065 0.103 -0.059 -0.177* -.173* 0.122 0.222** -0.106 -.176* -0.222** -0.530** 1     
GOV 0.054 0.340** -0.082 -0.115 -0.161* 0.007 0.107 0.043 -0.060 0.149* 0.031 0.077 -0.042 -0.065 0.045 1   
STATE# 0.012 -0.090 -0.090 0.131 -0.150* 0.072 -0.059 0.091 -0.036 0.356** -0.001 0.025 -0.039 0.064 -0.060 0.110 1 
INSTIT -0.024 0.151* 0.000 -0.133 0.049 0.154* 0.176* -0.032 -0.046 -0.038 -0.034 -0.038 -0.011 0.094 -0.061 -0.046 -0.564** 
 * p < .05, ** p < .01  
ABAC: Abnormal accruals. ACIND: Proportion of independent directors to total directors on the audit committee. ACEXP: Factor score of audit committee members' accounting, financial and 
industry experience is created by using principle components factor analysis. ACM: Number of audit committee meeting annually. ACSIZE: Number of directors on the audit committee. BIG4: 
Dummy variable if audited by Big4. LEV:  (Long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) / total assets. ROA: Return on asset. MBVA: Market to Book value of assets. LNAT: Log of Total assets 
in million RMB.YEAR04-08: Year dummy for 2004-2008. GOV: Dummy variable of 1 if the audit committee includes government officials; 0: otherwise. STATE: Proportion of State 
shareholdings to total issued shares. INSTIT: Proportion of non-controlling institutional investor shareholdings to total issued shares.  
 #Among the sample of 184 firms, there are 176 firms controlled directly and indirectly by the State. 
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TABLE 3 
Regression results for audit committee characteristics and abnormal accruals. 
                               Panel A – HKEX listing  
(N = 208) 
Panel B – China listing 
(N = 208) 
Panel C – HKEX listing 
(N = 184) 
     
  
Beta t Beta 
 
t Beta 
 
t 
(Constant) 0.077 1.240 0.253 2.529*** 0.222 3.746*** 
AC -0.007 -0.146 -0.015 -0.614   
ACIND     -0.077 -2.286*** 
ACEXP     -0.012 -1.972† 
ACM     0.002 0.449 
ACSIZE     -0.024 -3.019*** 
Controls       
BIG4 -0.055 -3.381**   0.047 1.499 -0.041 -2.647*** 
LEV -0.208 -4.023*** -0.086 -1.507 -0.246 -5.293*** 
ROA -0.272 -2.936*** -0.393 -4.335*** -0.333 -3.736*** 
MBVA -0.001 -0.323 0.001 1.438 -0.001 -0.597 
LNAT 0.011 2.279* -0.005 -0.460 0.012 2.568* 
YEAR       
2008 0.058 3.324* Included  0.056 3.417* 
Materials -0.013 -0.371 0.055 2.679 -0.004 -0.247 
Industrials -0.023 -1.261 0.075 2.528*** -0.031 -2.032* 
       
Adjusted R2  0.190  0.097  0.236 
F statistic  3.848***  2.312*  4.772*** 
† p < .10  
* p < .05  
** p < .01  
*** p < .001 
ABAC: Abnormal accruals. AC: Dummy variable 1 if the firm has an audit committee, 0 otherwise; ACIND: Proportion of 
independent directors to total directors on the audit committee. ACEXP: Factor score of audit committee members' accounting, 
financial and industry experience is created by using principle components factor analysis. ACM: Number of audit committee meeting 
annually. ACSIZE: Number of directors on the audit committee. BIG4: Dummy variable if audited by Big4. LEV:  (Long-term debt + 
debt in current liabilities) / total assets. ROA: Return on asset. MBVA: Market to Book value of assets. LNAT: Log of Total assets in 
million RMB. MATERIAL: dummy variable 1 if in material sector, 0 otherwise. INDUSTRIALS:  dummy variable 1 if in industrial 
sector, 0 otherwise. YEAR: Year dummy for 2004-2008.  
 
  
 
TABLE 4 
Results for moderating effects on audit committee characteristics and abnormal accruals. 
                                                                    Panel A–  
                                                        Government Officials  
(N = 184) 
Panel B –  
State Ownership 
(N = 176) 
Panel C – 
 Institutional Ownership 
(N = 184) 
  Beta t Beta t 
 
Beta t 
 (Constant) 0.146 1.830† 0.224 3.631*** 0.162 2.410** 
INTERACTIONxACIND -0.093 -1.369 0.044 1.081 -0.009 -0.116 
INTERACTIONxACEXP -0.007 -0.524 -0.017 -1.327 -0.027 -2.116* 
INTERACTIONxACM 0.010 1.325 0.000 -0.018 -0.003 -0.395 
INTERACTIONxACSIZE -0.034 -1.936** -0.012 -1.203 -0.040 -2.630** 
GOV/STATE/INSTIT 0.177 1.853** 0.017 1.275 0.155 1.659 
ACIND -0.036 -0.736 -0.092 -2.397** -0.064 -1.527* 
ACEXP -0.011 -1.183 -0.005 -0.595 0.000 -0.021 
ACM 0.001 0.227 0.001 0.311 0.003 0.602 
ACSIZE -0.007 -0.475 -0.022 -2.290* -0.009 -0.867 
Controls       
BIG4 -0.042 -2.707** -0.044 -2.777** -0.048 -3.024*** 
LEV -0.241 -5.061*** -0.230 -4.841*** -0.253 -5.353*** 
ROA -0.334 -3.649*** -0.333 -3.618*** -0.335 -3.765*** 
MBVA -0.001 -0.367 -0.001 -0.622 -0.001 -0.760 
LNAT 0.011 2.247† 0.013 2.410** 0.012 2.562* 
YEAR       
2008 0.056 3.364** 0.054 3.236*** 0.048 2.839† 
MATERIALS -0.012 -0.706 -0.010 -0.601 -0.001 -0.062 
INDUSTRIALS -0.035 -2.154* -0.034 -2.132* -0.030 -1.910† 
Adjusted R2  0.244  0.234  0.260 
F statistic  3.948***  3.800***  4.207*** 
† p < .10  
* p < .05  
** p < .01  
*** p < .001 
ABAC: Abnormal accruals.  INTERACTIONxACIND; INTERACTIONxACEXP; INTERACTIONxACM; 
INTERACTIONxACSIZE: GOV/STATE/INSTIT * ACIND/ACEXP/ACM/ACSIZE. GOV: Dummy variable of 1 if the audit 
committee includes government officials; 0: otherwise. STATE:  Dummy variable of 1 if the proportion of State shareholdings  to total 
issued shares is greater than or equal to the median (50.1%); 0 otherwise. INSTIT: Dummy variable of 1 if the proportion of non-
controlling institutional sponsor shareholdings to total issued shares is less than the median (15.65%); 0 otherwise. ACIND: Proportion 
of independent directors to total directors on the audit committee. ACEXP: Factor score of audit committee members' accounting, 
financial and industry experience is created by using principle components factor analysis. ACM: Number of audit committee meeting 
annually. ACSIZE: Number of directors on the audit committee. BIG4: Dummy variable if audited by Big4. LEV:  (Long-term debt + 
debt in current liabilities) / total assets. ROA: Return on asset. MBVA: Market to Book value of assets. LNAT: Log of Total assets in 
million RMB. MATERIAL: dummy variable 1 if in material sector, 0 otherwise. INDUSTRIALS:  dummy variable 1 if in industrial 
sector, 0 otherwise. YEAR: Year dummy for 2004-2008.   
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